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Abstract
Demonetization is an economic tool used to reduce the size of an underground economy.
Though studies on the effectiveness of demonetization have increased over the past 50
years, there is little literature on the ineffectiveness of demonetization and subsequent
factors that could explain a lack of change, or an increase, in illegal activity. This paper
examines past cases of demonetization to determine the effectiveness of demonetization,
and investigates the incentive for foreign currency substitution as a mechanism for
criminals to circumvent regulatory scrutiny. Major findings of this paper include a positive
but statistically insignificant correlation between demonetization and growth in the shadow
economy, and a statistically significant positive relationship between exchange rate
appreciation and demonetization. Finally, this paper applies these findings to test the “Modi
effect” of Indian Rupee (INR) demonetization.
Keywords: Demonetization, Underground Economy, India, Currency Substitution
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I.

Introduction
Demonetization is the retraction of specific currency denominations in circulation

and the subsequent replacement with new notes and coins. Initially, demonetization took
the form of replacing an existing currency with a new one, and was enacted to mitigate
cases of hyperinflation or to reduce large-denomination cash in circulation. Over time,
governments have extended the objectives of demonetizing local currency to address the
menaces of the underground economy 1 - of black money, activity, corruption, and
counterfeit production.
Demonetization is a powerful policy tool for reducing the size of the underground
economy. The underground economy hinges on cash transactions. 95% of transactions in
the underground economy are executed using cash. The benefit of a cash payment is the
“hidden” component of the transaction – that is, the parties involved are not obligated to
report the transaction officially. Given the difficulty of monitoring transactions in cash,
promoting alternative payment methods, and reducing the demand for cash, could help to
reduce the incidence of shadow economies. Thus, a tool like demonetization to replace
existing currency can be utilized to reduce the prevalence and reliance on cash by making
it inconvenient to obtain cash. As a result, more individuals are pushed into the formal
banking sector which requires official documentation of transactions. Furthermore,
nullifying the value of certain denominations of currency will bring forth “black
marketeers” who will need to exchange their existing notes for new notes, and will
consequently turn in their black money to be formally documented and destroyed. The

1

In this thesis, the underground economy is also referred to as the shadow economy,
black economy and informal economy.
5

origin of these notes would be documented and withdrawn from circulation, thereby
reducing the supply of black money in the economy.
Demonetization thus subjects individuals who hold black money to regulatory
scrutiny, as they are forced to exchange existing notes for new legal tender at state banks
that document the origins of currency. Consequently, heightened regulation makes it more
difficult for individuals to engage in the underground economy. However, there could be
ways to circumvent such regulation imposed by demonetization, such as through currency
substitution. The theory behind this is that if demonetization has an effect on exchange
rates, individuals could be incentivized to substitute locally demonetized currency with
new or foreign forms of currency, which would keep the quantity of money in circulation
unchanged, and even increase, illegal transactions and activity. Furthermore, regulatory
barriers imposed by demonetization could incentivize people to look to international
currency markets and substitute existing currency with foreign currency. This brings into
question the overall effectiveness of demonetization in reducing black market activity.
An argument can be made against the effectiveness of demonetization in reducing
black market activity. For one, many countries do not formally monitor and document the
transfer of old currency to new when such policies have been executed. As a result,
reducing the size of the underground economy can be a difficult, and impractical, endeavor.
Many economists have explored factors that contribute to the incidence of an underground
economy. However, few studies have examined the success of demonetization in reducing
the size of the informal economy and factors, such as currency substitution, that could
explain any failures of demonetization in reducing the size of the underground economy.

6

Several examples reveal successes and failures of demonetization. A success story
pertains to the case of the Nigerian Naira. In 1984, the Naira was demonetized, whereby
the government changed the color of all currency notes in circulation. The objective of this
policy was to monitor currency in circulation within and outside the country, with the hope
that a formal re-issuing and withdrawal system would encourage participation in the
banking sector. This forced currency hoarders to exchange old notes for new legal tender
at banks which documented currency that had been undocumented. Despite the negative
impact on inflation and the economy, it was an instant success in reviving the banking
industry and ceasing currency hoarding. An example of a failure occurred when specific
denominations of the Myanmar Kyat were demonetized in 1985 with the aim of curbing
illegal transactions in the informal economy. A cash floor was declared whereby those
holding cash above the limit could exchange existing notes for new legal tender notes
within a fixed time period. Black-market participants, however, were able to avoid the
regulatory scrutiny by using proxies to exchange their money and evade being caught.
In 2002, the European Union (EU) replaced 19 local currencies with the
introduction of the Euro. In this case, during the currency transition period 2, EU central
banks were required to document the outflow of Euros and inflow of local currency. This
form of monitoring was enacted to force holders of large amounts of local demonetized
currency to document its origins. Member states were given between January 1 and
February 28 to comply. This transitionary period allowed for a smoother transition to the
Euro. The limit on the amount of cash that could be exchanged for Euros varied across
2

The currency transition period lasted from 1 January 2002 to 28 February 2002. During
this time, local EU member currencies and the Euro were considered legal tender. On 28
February 2002, all local currencies were demonetized.
7

member states. In Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, and Spain, banks allowed people to
exchange unlimited amounts of cash at a set rate. Italy, Ireland, and Austria had cash
exchange ceilings of €516, €3633, and €635 per person. 3 These controls allowed for
monitoring deposits and withdrawals of old currency and new Euros. In effect, deposits of
black money into banks allowed the government to retract these notes from circulation,
and there was an expected reduction in the size of underground economies. 4
The lack of a formal monitoring system during a currency transition period can
sometimes increase the size of an underground economy. In 1978, the Indian government
enacted the High Denomination Bank Notes Act, which voided Indian Rupee (INR) 1000,
INR 5000 and INR 10000 notes. The expectation of completely destroying the black
economy, at that time 15% of GDP, was ambitious, and instead, the size of the underground
economy increased by 18%. 5 This was due to the lack of a strong and austere monitoring
system of retracting existing currency that could keep up with the rate of issuance of new
currency.
Now, India’s shadow economy is 46% of the country’s GDP. 6 India’s economy is
driven by cash, and more specifically, the role of high-value bank notes is significant. More
importantly, the underground economy runs on cash which fuels incentive to evade taxes
and scrutiny on transactions that are illegal. On November 8, 2016, Indian Prime Minister
3

For more information on cash exchange limits, see
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/cashchangeoverreport2002en.pdf
4
The size of the underground economy in the Euro-19 is examined from the period of
1998-2015 in the latter half of this paper.
5
For more information on the 1978 case of INR demonetization, see
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/1978-demonetisation-law-was-notunreasonable-SC-had-ruled/articleshow/55391335.cms
6
Shadow economy estimate taken from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201612-19/modi-s-holy-city-shows-a-1-trillion-hidden-economy-has-stalled
8

Narendra Modi launched a movement to demonetize INR 500 and INR 1000 currency notes
with the aim of tackling counterfeit, corruption, and black market activity. In place of
existing INR 500 and INR 1000 notes, Prime Minister Modi announced the creation of new
INR 500 and INR 2000 notes. The move has undoubtedly captured some of the illegal cash
in circulation, as illegal notes are turned in to banks to be exchanged for legal tender notes
and are therefore withdrawn from circulation. The Modi government has used evidence of
India’s expedient growth rate of 7% in Q4 2016 to illustrate the positive result of
demonetization. 7 Moreover, the administration attributes GDP growth to the abrogation of
these notes that the black market is centered on.
The reality, however, is not as simple as a GDP growth figure. It is important to
consider the real effectiveness of demonetization as a tool given its associated costs and
impact on an economy. By nullifying 86% of the cash in circulation, Modi’s currency
reform has severely impacted a significant portion of the population. Namely, low-income
and middle class households have been hit hard, as these classes use denominations of INR
500 and INR 1000 in daily transactions. A 50-day redemption period was set for people to
exchange notes at banks before the value of existing notes disappeared, which
caused millions of people to rush to banks, ATMs, and foreign exchange counters to
exchange their cash. 8 Moreover, with an estimated population of 600 million unbanked
Indians, and a scarcity of ATMs throughout the country, long-term effects of

7

For more information on the impact of INR demonetization, refer to
https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2017/march/india-where-is-the-negativeimpact-of-demonetization/.
8
For more information on the redemption period, see
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/12/10/indias-central-bank-denied-itsbig-payday-as-demonetization-flops/#6892b97e5494
9

demonetization appear bleak. The scramble to exchange existing notes for new notes from
state banks continues to be an issue. Prime Minister Modi believed that forcing people to
exchange existing currency for new legal tender at banks or official ATM machines would
subject participants of the black market to regulatory scrutiny, and as a result, reduce the
size of the underground economy. If a person wishes to exchange more than INR 250,000,
they must have suitable reasons as to why they are holding case in such large
denominations. Subjecting people to this sort of regulatory scrutiny is a disincentive for
cash hoarding, which could reduce the incidence of a shadow economy. However, these
stringent policies for exchanging old note for new notes have presented an obstacle for a
smooth transition instead, especially given the shortage of new notes to supplement
existing nullified notes. The run on cash could be drawn out if the government does not
take steps to print new notes to supplement all existing, void ones in circulation.
Additionally, with the majority of cash in circulation ceasing to be legal tender, economic
growth could plummet, and there is speculation of currency depreciation as investors are
incentivized to substitute foreign, stronger currencies. However, these costs are sometimes
necessary in the short-run to guarantee a reduction of the informal economy in the longrun after exchange rate recovery. Otherwise, demonetization could fail to significantly
reduce the size of the black economy, as currency substitution or continued hoarding of
new notes will sustain the size of this economy. Thus, the objective of this thesis is to
investigate Prime Minister Modi’s theory behind demonetization and to examine any
incentives for foreign currency substitution to avoid regulatory scrutiny during local
currency demonetization.

10

To test this theory, it is important to first examine whether demonetization reduces
the size of the underground economy. Data on the underground economy is hard to collect
due to the hidden nature of transactions in the underground economy. In this thesis, I will
examine various factors that affect the size of the underground economy, and the impact
of demonetization on its size. This will be accomplished through a panel regression
analysis with fixed effects. I investigate the case of 2002 “Euroization” and consequent
demonetization of 19 member state currencies using a panel regression with fixed effects
from 1998-2015. The Euro is a viable case study for three reasons. For one, the European
Central Bank (ECB) required all national central banks to provide issuance and collection
information on local currencies and the Euro banknote on a daily basis. Monitoring the
exchange of currency during the transition period was a concern, given that many
individuals held local currency abroad which complicated the exchange process. However,
the efficiency and preparedness of the ECB for the conversion period prevented any
shortages of currency and misreporting of exchanges. Additionally, the limited transition
period of 2 months prevented any possibility of converting hoarded cash to Euros in small
deposits. As a result, this allowed for further success in eliminating recurring circulation
of black money.
To understand any incentive for currency substitution to avoid the formal banking
sector, I will examine the effect of demonetization on exchange rates to examine the
motivation for foreign currency substitution in the informal sector. This analysis will be
conducted through a series of multivariate regressions for different episodes of
demonetization in 3 different countries. For the purpose of this thesis, I narrow the
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definition of demonetization to be the reissuing of notes of a specific currency, and/or the
nullification of existing currency.
This thesis proceeds as follows. First, I provide background information on the
framework and ideas that motivate the intent of this thesis. I incorporate past quantitative
and qualitative literature on the subject matter in order to motivate my empirical analysis
that follows after. The background section of this thesis focuses on three key themes: the
study of the informal economy, the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on underground
economy currency demand, and key cases of large-denomination demonetization.
Following this, I outline my hypothesis, data, and methodology, and conclude with an
analysis of the empirical results.

II.

Background

A. Understanding the Underground Economy
It is important to study the impact of demonetization on the underground economy.
The underground economy runs on illegal money, which effectively means any form of
income that has escaped taxation. Currency used in the underground economy is termed
“black money” because of its role in an illegal, or “black”, transactions. Illegal activities
that take place in the underground economy include bribery, drug trafficking, prostitution,
and fraud. Also termed the shadow economy, it includes not only illegal activity but also
unreported income for the purpose of tax evasion. Activities in the shadow economy rely
on physical cash, as transactions in the underground economy are typically settled with
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cash to evade tracing, as well as the ‘“store of value” appeal that encourages currency
hoarding.
Demonetization has evolved as a tool to reduce the incidence of the illegal activities
conducted in the underground economy, given that the majority of black market
transactions are executed in cash. To understand the effectiveness of demonetization, it is
crucial to examine the evolution of the underground economy during a period of
demonetization. Estimating the size of the shadow economy is a difficult endeavor due to
the difficulty of tracing transactions hidden from the official economy. However,
economists have identified several ways to best estimate the underground economy. When
analyzing the effect of demonetization, it is imperative to look at cases where the
underground economy was successfully reduced, and where it was not. Furthermore, it is
important to understand any incentive for foreign currency substitution during
demonetization in order to circumvent exchanging cash at banks and being subjected to
regulatory scrutiny. This can be achieved through examining exchange rates.

B. Exchange Rates, Currency Demand, and the Size of the Underground
Economy
As explained by Feige (2003), “cash stocks and flows are a natural starting point in
the search for knowledge concerning the underground economy...since the production and
distribution of currency by the government is strictly monitored and carefully recorded.”
The quantity of currency in circulation can impact exchange rates and demand for currency.
Thus, in testing Prime Minister Modi’s theory of the effectiveness of demonetization, it is
important to understand the relationship between demonetization, the money supply, and
exchange rates. Traditionally, demonetization causes a contraction in the money supply.
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This occurs when specific denominations of currency are nullified and withdrawn from the
economy, thereby reducing the quantity of cash in circulation. When the quantity of cash
in circulation is reduced, the value of one unit of a local currency increases, incentivizing
individuals to hold onto it. In contrast, when a local currency depreciates, people may look
to stronger foreign currencies as a substitute. This form of de facto currency substitution
can take place in the informal and formal economy. According to Feige (2003), de facto
currency demand arises as a result of a loss of confidence in the domestic currency due to
currency devaluations, as foreign currency is usually the preferred medium of exchange
for illegal transactions. Thus, an increase in the demand for foreign currency after an
episode of demonetization can incentivize black marketeers to use foreign currency,
leaving the size of the black market unchanged.
In cases of demonetization where a new currency is introduced and an existing
currency is demonetized, people are incentivized to convert to the new currency as existing
currency is no longer legal tender, and the new currency appreciates in value due to the
increase in the money supply. Similarly, in cases where denominations of notes are
nullified, the reduction in the quantity of money causes an appreciation of the currency and
will also encourage people to hold on. In the case of India, the INR remained the local
currency, but INR 1000 notes were completely voided, and therefore withdrawn from
circulation, thereby decreasing the money supply. In its place, INR 2000 notes were issued.
An immediate appreciation of the INR against the US Dollar followed this policy change.
However, despite currency appreciation, and given the difficulty of obtaining these new
denominations of legal tender, there may have been incentive to substitute INR with other
foreign currency. This would have allowed for the continuation of black market

14

transactions. The only difference would be the currency used to execute such transactions,
thus leaving the size of the informal economy unchanged.
Understanding the relationship between exchange rates, currency demand, and the
underground economy can provide additional insight into the case and effects of Prime
Minister Modi’s INR demonetization in India. If exchange rate fluctuation encourages
currency substitution, a case can be made for the stagnation of the size of an underground
economy. Hellersten and Ryan (2011) found that 2002 “Euroization” resulted in a surge in
demand for the Euro instead of Dollars. They cite Stix (2007), who examined currency
demand in Croatia, Slovenia, and Slovakia, and found that more households held Euros.
Additionally, they found a weak relationship between the size of the informal economy
and currency flows. Their findings specifically indicate that a 1-percent higher level of
underground activity results in a 1-percent higher level of banknote flows. Thus, there
appears to be a unit elastic increase in dollar use with every percent increase in underground
economy activity. This indicates that an increase in the demand for dollars is a reflection
of the success of demonetization in incentivizing the use of foreign currency, but does not
necessarily change the size of the black market economy.
One of the earliest studies of the underground economy was by Phillip Cagan
(1958), who proposed the currency ratio method in 1958 as a form of sizing an informal
economy. His analysis of currency flows during and after World War I and II showed that
black market activity increases the demand for currency - between 1940-45 the share of
twenty dollar bills of and over surged from 49 to 60% of the total value of the currency.
The currency demand method was furthered by Tanzi (1983), who argued that measuring
total currency in circulation would lead to an estimate of the underground economy.
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Additionally, black market rates could be beneficial in examining demand of
currency in the underground economy, as black marketeers may rely on these rates as
opposed to official rates. For example, Btejer (1978) examined the effects of black market
exchange rate expectations on the domestic demand for money in Brazil, Chile, and
Columbia. He found that a depreciation in the black market exchange rate decreases
demand for currency and as a result, decreases local money supply. A decrease in money
demand in the underground economy could reflect a decrease in its size.
A consideration of the multi-faceted relationship between exchange rates, currency
demand, and the shadow economy is beneficial in assessing the net impact of Modi’s
demonetization. Currency exchange restrictions could result in a shortage of local or
foreign currency which provides an opportunity for black market arbitrage. More recently,
the INR has depreciated with respect to the US Dollar, due to a reduction in foreignexchange holdings by the central bank. Given that the local currency was not replaced with
a new one, currency depreciation could explain an unchanged underground economy in the
future despite currency demonetization, as depreciation in the INR could just encourage
foreign currency substitution and an overall unchanged volume of black cash in circulation.

C. The Effect of Demonetization on the Size of the Underground Economy
The main objectives of demonetization are to combat inflation, corruption, and
unreported income. In India, Prime Minister Modi had a vision to completely destroy the
underground economy through demonetization. The size of the informal economy in India
is large. In 2010, according to Schneider et al. (2010), the estimated size of the shadow
economy in India is 19% of its GDP. Now, it is almost 50% of its GDP. This is due to the
large creation of informal jobs, further propagated by expansion in industries like
16

construction, textiles, and retail. Additionally, asset hoarding, in the form of real estate,
jewelry, or assets stashed abroad, cater to the large presence of underground activity. 9 In
India, 98% of transactions are completed in cash. Given that a large amount of transactions
are cash-based in the underground economy, eliminating high-denomination notes could
help curtail illegal transactions. Additionally, the underground economy is driven by tax
evasion, as it is a massive lost tax haven since those engaged in this parallel economy
misreport or do not report their income in order to evade income tax.
Demonetization succeeds when a strong regulatory system in banks is implemented
to document the origins of cash and income. In the case of Prime Minister Modi’s INR
demonetization program in 2016, it is vital to examine the effect of demonetization in
forcing people into the banking sector, and consequently, subjecting them to regulatory
scrutiny. Prime Minister Modi retracted INR 500 and INR 1000 notes and replaced them
with new INR 500 and INR 2000 notes. 47.8% of all notes were in denominations of INR
500, and INR 1000 notes accounted for 38.6%. A “cleaning” of black money through
demonetization as enacted by Prime Minister Modi has required the exchange of INR 500
and 1000 notes via official banks. This has forced people to go through the formal banking
system in order to obtain legal tender notes. As a result, unreported income is documented
and therefore taxable. Through forcing people under regulatory scrutiny, Prime Minister
Modi predicted a sharp retraction of black money in circulation. As Prime Minister Modi
argues, demonetization complements the country’s Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, or Clean India
Campaign, a campaign that envisions a clean and hygienic India. As Modi stated on

9

For more information on what constitutes the underground economy, see
http://www.nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2016/12/WP_2016_184.pdf
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November 8, 2016, “to break the grip of corruption and black money, we have decided that
the currency notes presently in use will no longer be legal tender from midnight tonight”,
with the Finance Minister Arun Jaitley claiming that “the goal of this is to clean
transactions, [to] clean money.” 10
It is crucial to ensure the success of demonetization given the immense costs. In
India, the economic costs have been extreme. Retail markets have been largely affected
throughout the country. For example, in the retail sector, Hindustan Unilever Limited, a
subsidiary of Unilever, saw its sales fall 1.2 % between October and December. 11 This has
been exacerbated by the volatility of government policy on ATM exchange limits. Initially,
the exchange limit had been imposed as INR 4,000 per person per day. This increased to
INR4,500 per person per day one week after Modi’s announcement, and then fell to INR
2,000 the week after. Shortly after, people were forced to exchange their cash at banks once
the government halted over-the-counter exchanges of notes altogether. 12 The limited
options of exchanging currency has resulted in a widespread cash crunch, where consumers
are coping with never-ending lines outside banks due to empty ATM machines. This has
significantly affected segments of the population that remain unbanked. Several factors,
such as regulatory constraints, high banking fees, and lack of accessibility to banks, explain
the prevalence of an unbanked population that continue to rely on physical cash for dayto-day transactions.
10

For more information, see http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/demonetizationindia-will-pay-price/.
11
Impact on Hindustan Unilever: http://www.forbesindia.com/article/q3-earnings2017/volume-growth-at-hul-stalls/45537/1
12
For more information on cash exchange limits in India, see
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/4/indias-rupee-demonetization-policycreates-cash-cr/
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Similarly, the transition to the Euro in 2002 was in actual fact not wholly smooth.
Shortly after the introduction, output and productivity growth slumped. Meanwhile,
uneven inflation and labor costs resulted in a lack of competitive edge in some member
states, given the need to adjust to the new unionized currency. Other past cases of
demonetization are the 1984 demonetization of the Nigerian Naira, and the 1985
demonetization of specific denominations of the Myanmar Kyat. These cases will be
discussed later.

I. European Union and the Euro
The introduction of the Euro in 2002, and the consequent demonetization of local
EU member currencies during the transition period, is important to examine in order to
understand the effect of demonetization on the size of an underground economy.
Investigating the transition period from 1 January 2002 to 28 February 2002, and the years
thereafter can aid an exploration into the effectiveness of demonetization on the size of the
underground economy. By examining various factors that affect the underground economy
during demonetization, we can explore the effect of Euro adoption on the size of EU
underground economies, which can shed light on whether Prime Minister Modi’s theory
of demonetization and if the reducing effect on the underground economy holds true.
On January 1, 1999, the European Union (EU) introduced the Euro as a standard,
unionized form of currency for EU member states. In its first 3 years of existence, the Euro
was utilized for accounting purposes and acted as an invisible currency. Euro notes and
coins were only introduced on 1 January 2002, which marked the beginning of the
transitional period for EU countries. By February 28, 2002, all of the Euro-19 members
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were required to adopt the Euro as a national currency, thereby demonetizing the existing
local currency available in each country.
Since its introduction, the Euro has been in high demand. As the years have passed,
there has been a gradual increase in the number of banknotes in circulation. According to
the European Central Bank, “cash is by far the most widely used means of payment for
retail transactions in the euro area in terms of number of transactions.” 13 Following Euro
adoption, the Euro area saw a growth rate of cash demand of over 10%, and more
specifically, with demand for 500 Euro notes skyrocketing at a growth rate of 20%.14
Moreover, as Figure 1 in my Appendix illustrates, the growth rate of cash usage and the
growth of shadow economy proportionally increased immediately after the introduction of
the Euro in 2002. This provides evidence for a correlation between the cash supply and the
size of the underground economy. Thus, a reduction in the money supply through
demonetization would intuitively reduce the size of the underground economy. This
relationship should be considered in testing Prime Minister Modi’s theory, given that his
policy called for demonetization of 86% of the money supply.
In many EU member states, the size of the underground economy was significant.
According to an ECB report, during this period, roughly half the circulating €50 notes were
hoarded cash, and 40% of total cash was held as a store of value. 15 In 2002, the selfliquidating nature of local currencies incentivized higher spending of currency, thereby

13

This quote was taken from the ECB website,
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/intro/html/index.en.html
14
Statistics of cash demand and usage in the Euro area in 2002 were collected from
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10168737.2010.525992?needAccess=true
15
ECB Report on Euro Banknotes:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2014/html/sp140519.en.html
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reducing the appeal of hoarding. This could have further encouraged those holding cash to
put hoards in banks given the loss of value of the cash in possession.
Having said that, there are ways in which individuals can side-step exchanging cash
via the formal banking sector. For example, an examination of the effect of demonetization
on exchange rates could explain motives for currency substitution through international
markets. In turn, this would allow us to explore any changes to the size of the underground
economy post-demonetization that can be attributed to foreign currency substitution,
thereby either keeping the volume of cash in circulation unchanged or causing an increase.
We can draw this conclusion from cash in circulation on the basis that 95% of transactions
in the underground economy are cash-based.
It is important to additionally consider the exchange policy in the case of the Euro.
The transitional, dual circulation period in which local European currencies and the Euro
were considered legal tender was between 1 January, 2002 and February 28, 2002. On 28
February, 2002, all local European currencies were nullified, and the Euro was the only
official legal currency. The process of banknote and coin conversion was facilitated
through three channels public will receive banknotes and coins from three main channels.
ATMs dispensed 20 and 50 Euro notes, while banks supplied larger denominations of
notes. Additionally, coins would be exchanged through in-store transactions. Local
currencies were removed from circulation when they are used for payment or taken to
banks for deposit during the transitional period. 16 By 4 January 2002, 80 % of ATMs were
dispensing solely Euros. Shortly after the announcement on 1 January, people scrambled
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For more information, see http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/avs/files/euro/092-eurofi/plan_for_adoption.pdf
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to exchange existing currency for Euros, resulting in a large-scale cash run and a surge in
ATM queues. 17 Thus, the dates of interest when analyzing the case of the Euro are 1
January 2002, and 28 February 2002.
The relevance of this case study in understanding the effect of Modi’s INR
demonetization is multifold. A panel regression reveals the effect of various contributing
variables on the size of the underground economy over a fixed time period. This allows us
to understand possible factors that influence the size of the underground economy which
we can extrapolate to the India case. More importantly, adoption of the Euro by member
countries and the effect of this on the size of the underground economy is an important
metric. This shows whether adoption of a new currency, and demonetization of an old
currency, has any significant effect in reduces the size of the underground economy. We
can use these results to further understand the outcome of Indian demonetization.

II.

Nigeria and the Naira
Examining the case of the Naira is value-adding to an analysis of demonetization

and the underground economy. Naira demonetization was similar in nature to that of the
case in India because the local currency was not replaced but rather the appearance of
certain notes was changed. In April 1984, General Buhari launched a demonetization of
the Nigerian Naira and ordered the change of the color of the notes in circulation. No new
currency denominations were introduced. The 20 Naira note was changed from yellow to
green, while the 5 Naira note was changed from green to pink. Additionally, the 10 note
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See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=cellar:bb43afaa-4203-45a2be1d-abc1e22c58cf
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was changed from pink to red while the 1 Naira note, which was red was changed to
yellow. 18
This move of demonetization was propelled by the objective of deterring corrupt
officials and businessmen from hoarding large amounts of cash or engaging in illegal cashbased transactions. As people were forced to exchange existing notes for new notes at
official banks, currency in circulation that had been unaccounted for emerged, and
counterfeit currency was eliminated.
While the move resulted in a significant reduction in the underground economy,
regulatory scrutiny could have encouraged people to simply replace existing currency with
foreign currency. Therefore, it is important to consider incentives for currency substitution
and the continued prevalence of shadow activity. Extending the analysis further, an
examination of exchange rate patterns centered on the event of demonetization in 1984
would allow for an analysis of the impact of demonetization on exchange rates. Exchange
rate fluctuations can explain currency demand patterns. Given the volatility of the Naira
during this time, there can be a case made for currency substitution incentive. With the
depreciation of the Naira following demonetization, individuals could have been
incentivized to acquire stronger, more stable foreign currency as a more reliable store of
value. Furthermore, a strong, stable currency would allow minimization of any losses in a
transaction. Finally, given that 95% of transactions in the underground economy are cashbased, possessing a strong form of currency is vital for profitability. We can use the results
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1984 Nigerian Naira demonetization:
http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/32390/1/RP55.pdf?1
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from this study to understand potential for any currency substitution in the underground
economy, and whether this is a fair consideration for future impact in India.

III.

Myanmar and the Kyat
The case of Kyat demonetization is also important to consider in exploring the

effectiveness of demonetization in reducing the incidence of the underground economy.
On November 4, 1985, the Myanmar government devalued all 20, 25, and 100 Kyat notes
without warning, and introduced new 75 Kyat notes in limited quantity. The transition
period for exchanging notes, as well as the number of new notes available for exchange,
was extremely limited. The demonetization regime was launched in an effort to decrease
the money supply, reduce inflation, and identify corrupt, illegal individuals who were
hoarding large amounts of currency. 19 As Than (1987) writes, the objective of this
demonetization episode, which affected 80% of the money supply, was “to uncover black
money in the hands of money hoarders who are hindering socialist economic construction”.
The result of this move was unsuccessful, as participants of the black market found ways
to avoid regulatory scrutiny through using proxies to exchange cash in different amounts
at banks, thereby allowing them to continue engaging in black market activity.
The Myanmar Kyat demonetization resembles the recent episode in India, whereby
certain denominations of notes were extracted from circulation and replaced with new
notes. The result of this case forces us to turn to other factors that explain why the size of
the informal economy remained unchanged. An analysis of exchange rate patterns around
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1985 Kyat demonetization:
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/48478/16Mar_Stein_Pamela.pdf?sequenc
e=1
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the time of the event would be beneficial to consider in understanding the impact of
demonetization of this kind on exchange rates. Furthermore, I extend my analysis to
analyze the incentive for foreign currency substitution in the case of exchange rate
depreciation. This is especially important to consider in light of the limited exchange period
during demonetization, as this could have incentivized a move towards foreign currency
substitution. Similar to the case of Nigeria, we can apply these findings to test Prime
Minister Modi’s theory, and determine if there is any scope for currency substitution in the
underground economy in the future in India, and whether this would leave the size of the
underground economy unchanged.
In the next section, I will outline my hypothesis and then outline the methodology
and data of my empirical studies.

III.

Hypothesis

The size of the underground economy is largely affected by several independent
variables, and specifically, inflation, income tax, unemployment, interest rates, corruption,
and GDP growth. Demonetization should have a decreasing effect on the size of an
underground economy, given that the supply of money reduces. This hinges on the strength
of monitoring systems and regulatory scrutiny in the formal banking sector that would
require black market participants to turn money in. With respect to INR demonetization,
the inconvenience and difficulty of exchanging cash through the formal banking sector
could impede the effectiveness of demonetization, thus leaving the underground economy
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remains unchanged. Thus, there could be incentive to look to foreign currency substitution
as an alternative to continue executing illegal transactions.
I predict that in the case of an unchanged or growing size of an underground
economy, there is much that can be explained by the incentive to substitute currency as a
result of the effect of demonetization on exchange rates.

IV.

Data Sources

A.

Panel Regression Data
The panel regression includes all Euro-19 countries from 1998-2015, totaling 17

years. The objective of the panel regression is to examine the relationship, if any, between
currency demand, the size of the underground economy, and currency demonetization after
the introduction of the Euro in 2002. The data collected for size of underground economies
in Europe is from Schenider (2010) from 1999 to 2016. Countries included are: Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Slovakia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
The dependent variable in this model is the size of the underground economy. The
dependent variable is represented as a percent of GDP figure. The data for this variable
was collected from Schneider (2006). These figures were calculated using the Multiple
Indicators and Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model. 20 MIMIC estimates are more precise as it
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The MIMIC model examines the relationship between causal variables and a latent
variable, and additionally examines the impact of the latent variable on each independent
variable.
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treats the shadow economy as a latent variable and identifies various causes of the shadow
economy by differentiating indicators and causes. Additionally, the MIMIC model is most
applicable to time series data to trace the development of the shadow economy over time.
The independent variables include GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, income
tax rates, long-term interest rates, corruption ranking, unemployment rates, and inflation
rates. Data for these variables in this regression were collected from an array of sources.
Tax and interest rates were drawn from the World Bank DataBank database. Exchange
rates were drawn from the Global Financial Data Exchange Rate Database. GDP per capita
and per capita growth figures were obtained from the IMF Database. The Corruptions
Perception Index (CPI) rankings were collected from the Transparency International.
Inflation rates were extracted from the World Bank DataBank.

B.

Exchange Rate Multivariate Regression Data
A series of multivariate regressions were conducted to analyze the effect of

demonetization on exchange rates in order to understand the likelihood of foreign currency
substitution in underground economies.
For the regressions focusing on the Euro, weekly, daily, and monthly 3-month
forward Euro-USD exchange rates were collected. These data sets were drawn from the
Global Financial Data Exchange Rate Database. I chose to use three sets of data to identify
consistencies, or differences, across different types of data. Daily exchange rates provide
higher frequency data, allowing for more degrees of freedom and a more precise fix on the
event dates, but at the expense of significant day-to-day noise that could confound
estimates. On the other hand, weekly and monthly data are less precise but reduce the
amount of noise. I chose to use forward rates given that forward rates are future oriented
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and could shed light on expected future impact of demonetization. Monthly black market
spot rates for the Kyat-USD and Naira-USD were also drawn from the Global Financial
Data Exchange Rate Database for Myanmar and Nigeria respectively. While official rates
were extractable for the Eurozone for the event window, black market exchange rates were
the only available rates for the Nigerian Naira and Myanmar Kyat around the respective
event windows.
For the Euroization event, the 2 event dates are the official circulation of Euro notes
and coins on 1 January 2002, and the completion of the changeover of all European Union
members on 28 February 2002. For the demonetization of the Nigerian Naira in 1984, there
is no literature that indicates a specific date on which the demonetization policy was issued.
Instead, the key month of focus is April 1984. Lastly, for the case of Myanmar, the key
date is 3 November, 1985, when the 20,25 and 100 Kyat notes were demonetized.
In the next section, I will proceed to outline the econometric methods I have used
in this paper. First, I will explain the panel regression for the case of the 2002 Euroization,
and will follow with an explanation of the exchange rate multivariate regressions for the
2002 Euro case, the 1984 Naira case, and the 1985 Kyat case.

V.

Methodology
A. Panel Regression
A panel regression allows for observing the behavior of several entities across a

window of time. The merits to a panel method are that it allows for controlling variables
that are unobservable or differences across entities.
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A time-series panel regression is a macroeconomic approach to estimating the size
of an underground economy over a specified time frame. The objective of conducting a
time-series panel regression is to examine any possible attributions of growth in the size of
underground economies to the explanatory variables in the model. I will analyze two
different panel regression: a regression that includes all independent variables, and a
stacked panel that gradually incorporates each independent variable. The panel regressions
accounts for fixed effects for the variables that represent the year from 1998-2015 (year)
and country (country). The variables included in the panel regressions can be found in
Table 4.
In order to evaluate any possible correlation between the size of the underground
economy and GDP, tax rates, unemployment, exchange rates and corruption, this thesis
will utilize a panel regression method. The equation for my panel regression is:
𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖_𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆 = 𝜷𝜷𝟎𝟎 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐 𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 + 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜷𝜷𝟒𝟒 𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖 +

𝜷𝜷𝟓𝟓 𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄 + 𝜷𝜷𝟔𝟔 𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈 + 𝜷𝜷𝟕𝟕 𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈𝒈 + 𝜷𝜷𝟖𝟖 𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋 × 𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆 + 𝒖𝒖 (1)

where under_econ represents the size of the underground economy, inflation represents
the inflation rate as a percent of the GDP deflator, tax represents the tax on capital gains
and income as a percent of GDP, intrate represents the long-term interest rates as a percent
of GDP, unemp represents the rate of unemployment as a percent of the labor force, corrupt
represents the ranking on the CPI scale from 1-9, gdppc represents GDP per capita in US
Dollar figures, gdpgrowth represents the per capita growth rate, and a variable with an
interactive dummy to account for the year that a specific country adopted the Euro (joined
and eurojoin (dummy)). These explanatory variables have been incorporated into the
model from Feige (1979), Schneider (2005), Tanzi (1983), Bordo and Choudhri (1982),
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Btejer (1978), and Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984). Finally, joined represents the year
that each country joined the EU, and eurojoin is a dummy variable that signifies every year
including and thereafter that each country fully implemented the Euro.
In this model, the dependent variable is the size of the underground economy. Over
the past few decades, economists have identified various econometric methods to estimate
this. These include the currency demand method pioneered by Cagan (1958) and further
developed by Tanzi (1983) and Bhattacharyya (1990), the transactions method (Feige,
1979) and MIMIC (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes) proposed by Frey and WeckHannemann (1984) and further modified by Schneider (1997). Given that my panel
regression is based on time-series data, I obtained estimates for the size of the EU
underground economies using the MIMIC approach. The MIMIC approach was further
developed by Schneider (2005), who identifies taxation, intensity of state regulations, labor
market regulations, and public sector services as key explanatory variables that determine
the size of the underground economy in a specific country. The following paragraph
provides a rationale for the independent variables included in my model.
First, the income tax burden significantly influences the underground economy.
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) argue that underground economic activity tends to imply
tax evasion, which allows us to conclude that factors affecting evasion of taxes will impact
the shadow economy. The role of tax in the size of underground economy has been
analyzed by Tanzi (1983), who found that as higher taxes incentivizes cash-based taxevading activities. Feige (2003) identifies interest rates and inflation as key influencing
variables, as rising interest rates and declining inflation encourage an increase in cash
holdings, especially in many developing countries with large underground economies.
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Easton (2001) claims that electric power consumption is a strong measure of economic
activity. Furthermore, by using electricity consumption as a proxy for official and
unofficial activity combined, unofficial activity can be singled out and estimated as the size
of the underground economy. As Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984) argue, the
unemployment rate is a key determinant of the underground economy, as an unemployed
person has more incentive to find work in the shadow economy. Finally, Schneider (2006)
highlights regulation as a key explanatory variable, whereby lack of stringent regulations
encourages higher corruption in the form of cash-based illicit activities.
I have included a few of many explanatory variables that could affect the size of an
underground economy. An additional factor that is excluded from the model. An
examination of exchange rate fluctuations would be valuable in understanding currency
demand during monetary reforms such as currency demonetization. For example, foreign
cash transactions reduce the costs of tax evasion and facilitate illegal activity, as foreign
currency can be obtained through international exchange markets to evade documentation.
It is therefore important to understand how demonetization affects exchange rates and if
there is any consequent effect on currency demand and the size of the underground
economy. This is achieved through a multivariate regression analysis.

B. Exchange Rate Multivariate Regression
In this thesis, I have employed a multivariate regression method to analyze the
statistical significance of key dates of demonetization with respect to exchange rates for
three case studies. These cases are the introduction of the Euro in 2002, the demonetization
of the Nigerian Naira in 1984, and the demonetization of specific denominations of the
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Myanmar Kyat in 1985. Key dates of interest and time frames for each case are outlined in
Table 1.
Appreciation or depreciation of exchange rates can illuminate foreign currency
demand patterns in the formal and informal economy. Many economists have studied the
impact of currency substitution on demand for money in the formal economy. Bordo and
Choudhri (1982) investigated the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on money demand
and subsequently, the likelihood of currency substitution in Canada. They found
proportionality between the expected rate of return on foreign money and the expected
appreciation of the exchange rate. However, in the case of Canada, their findings indicated
statistical insignificance, and as such, that even if significant amounts of foreign currency
are held, currency substitution does not impact demand for money function.
Additional studies indicate a weak relationship between currency demand and
official exchange rates. Ortiz (1983) further investigates the relationship between foreign
currency demand and exchange rates in Mexico during the “dollarization” surge after 1954
through a system of regressions. His findings indicate that money demand estimations
show that foreign exchange rates do not significantly affect the demand for pesos, so there
is no evidence of currency substitution.
Others have examined the effect of black market exchange rate fluctuations on
demand for money. Black market exchange rates could be beneficial to examine when
estimating the foreign currency demand in the underground economy, as individuals may
rely on these rates as opposed to official rates. It is important to consider the relationship
between official and black market exchange rates in examining patterns of currency
demand. Goldberg and Karimov (1997) argue that a devaluation of the official exchange
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rate increases the likelihood of depreciation of the black market exchange rate since the
official devaluation increases the attractiveness of foreign currency circulation in the
underground economy.
Furthermore, case studies examining competition between the strength of the dollar
and euro have revealed a reduction in reliance on US Dollars abroad. The size of the
underground economy does not greatly increase the likelihood of de facto currency
adoption, but there appears to be a unit elastic increase in dollar use with every percent
increase in underground economy activity (Stix 2007). Therefore, it is important to
consider exchange rate fluctuations and the effect on currency demand.
The first study examines the effect of European currency demonetization on the
official Euro-US Dollar exchange rate with respect to the introduction of the Euro in 2002.
Exchange rate data spanned from 4 January 1999 to 4 January 2005. Two potentially
significant dates of the transition period during Euroization were 1 January 2002, and 28
February 2002. 21 Weekly, monthly, and daily 3-month forward exchange rates were used.
The second study examines the effect of demonetization of the Nigerian Naira in 1984 on
the monthly black market exchange rate of the Naira-US Dollar. The time frame examined
begins 1 November 1982 to 1 November 1985, focusing on April 1984 as the key month
in which the policy change took place. The final study examines the 1985 demonetization
of 20, 25 and 100 denominations of the Myanmar Kyat on the monthly black market
exchange rate of the Kyat-US Dollar, with an event window of 1 April 1983 to 1 April
1986. Event windows of ± 3 years were applied to assess the longer-term impact of
demonetization events. In each case, three different regressions were conducted to compare
21

1 January 2002 is represented by event1, 28 February 2002 is represented by event2
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immediate, short-term, and long-term impact of demonetization on exchange rates through
variations in the dummy variable specification. These specifications are described in Table
2.
The equation for this model is:
𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆 = 𝜷𝜷𝟎𝟎 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏 𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐 𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 + 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑 𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆(𝟏𝟏 𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐 𝟐𝟐) + 𝜺𝜺 22 (2)

The dependent variable is the daily fluctuation in the exchange rate (official or
black market) and the independent variables are 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 , a lag on the exchange rate,
time, and event1 or event2. A description of the variables can be found in Table 3.

VI. Results
A. Main Panel Regression Results
The first empirical method I used was a panel regression of the size of the
underground economy of the Euro-19 against the following variables: inflation rates, longterm interest rates, income tax rates, unemployment rates, corruption rankings, GDP per
capita, and GDP per capita growth rates. A panel regression was conducted to examine the
effects of each of these variables on the size of the underground economy. Table 5
illustrates the results of the main panel regression, incorporating all independent variables
with year and country fixed effects. Figure 2 illustrates a trend of the size of the
underground economy for each of the Euro-19 members over the period of 1998-2015.
Most of these countries illustrate a downward trend on the size of the underground
economy. It is noteworthy to highlight the downward trend post-2002 (represented by a
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For Euro regressions, I used the variables discount_exch (difference between forward
and spot rate over the spot rate) and lag1 (first lag of discount_exch) instead of exchrate
and exchratet-1.
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red line in each graph). This could reflect a simple decreasing effect of demonetization on
the size of EU underground economies. Additionally, Figure 3 is a chart that illustrates
average annual figures of the size of the underground economy of the Euro-19 from 19982015.
A 1% increase in inflation results in a 1.026% decrease in the size of the
underground economy. This is consistent with my prediction of a negative relationship, but
runs contrary to the idea that an increase in inflation results in lower purchasing power and
strengthens incentive to enter the hidden economy to reduce the risk of high costs. (Asiedu
and Stengos, 2014)
A 1% increase in the income tax rate results in a 0.254% increase in the size of the
underground economy. This is consistent with my prediction of a positive sign. An increase
in tax encourages more tax evading behavior, as individuals are more incentivized to find
ways to avoid tax burden.
A 1% increase in the unemployment rate results in a 1.111% decrease in the size of
the underground economy. This is consistent with my prediction of a negative relationship
because an increase in the unemployment rate could indicate a rise in the number of people
who work in the underground economy. (Giles and Tedds, 2002)
A 1 kWh unit increase in electric power consumption results in a 0.0122-unit
increase in the size of the underground economy. My prediction for this metric runs
contrary to the evidence provided. Kaliberda (1996) claims that electric power
consumption is regarded as the single best physical indicator of official and unofficial
economic activity. Thus, looking at the unofficial economy portion of electric power
consumption can shed light on the size of an underground economy.
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A 1-unit increase in the ranking of a country on the Corruption Perceptions Index
results in a 51.44-unit decrease in the size of the underground economy. This contrasts my
prediction of a positive correlation. Rose-Ackerman (1997) claims that corruption
perceptions could influence attitudes towards institutional credibility and can thus
incentivize or deters illicit activity.
A $1 increase in GDP per capita results in a 0.000257-unit increase in the size of
the underground economy (Ene and Stefanescu, 2011). This parallels my prediction of a
positive sign.
A 1% increase in the GDP per capita growth rate results in a 2.51% increase in the
size of the underground economy. This evidence supports my prediction of a positive
relationship.

B. Stacked Panel Regression Results
The second panel regression conducted is a stacked regression, gradually
incorporating one variable at a time into the model. These results are also shown in Table
5.
The results of interest in this regression are the coefficient and standard errors
corresponding to the dummy variable, eurojoin. When eurojoin is the only variable
included in the model, a coefficient of 17.52 with a standard error of -38.02 is produced.
This indicates that for every additional earlier year that a country adopts the Euro, there is
a 17.32% increase in the size of the underground economy. When inflation is added, the
coefficient decreases to 16.74. After tax is included in the model, the coefficient rises to
17.78. Adding intrate results in a coefficient of 17.49. Unemployment included in the
model produces a coefficient of 18.52. Once eleccons is included, the coefficient rises to
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19.1. Following thereafter, as corrupt, gdppc and gdpgrowth are included, the coefficients
gradually rise at 28.62, 28.54 and 30.44 respectively. Results are not significant for any of
the iterations. Thus, there is no evidence of a significant effect of Euro adoption on the size
of the underground economy in this regression.
What the overall trend suggests is that as more control variables are added to the
model, there appears to be an overall increase in the strength of the correlation between
eurojoin and under_econ. This suggests that if other conditions such as high interest rates,
high inflation, and low GDP per capita growth (to name a few) exist, and if eurojoin is
included in the model, there is an increase in the size of the underground economy as a
percent figure of total GDP. While this appears to be the trend, we cannot establish
causality due to insignificance of the coefficients.

C. Exchange Rate Multivariate Regressions Results
I. Euro
A series of regressions were conducted on the Euro to USD exchange rate over the
period of 1999-2005. I conducted regressions using weekly, monthly, and daily exchange
rate data for comprehensiveness. In each regression, the two event dates are 1 January
2002, and 28 February 2002. On 1 January 2002, Euro banknotes and coins were
introduced and circulated. On 28 February 2002, the Euro was recognized as the sole
currency holding legal tender throughout the euro area. 19 European countries demonetized
their respective local currencies and adopted the Euro. These regressions are distinguished
by different specifications of the dummy variable included in the model, eurojoin. The
specifications for each regression can be found in Table 4. These specifications allow for
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analysis of the immediate, short term, and long term impact of demonetization of local
currency and adoption of the Euro.
All Euro regressions follow a standard model of regressing the 3-month forward
discount rates (discount_exch) 23 against the first lag of this variable (lag1) and the dummy
variable for the events of interest (event). The time trend variable (time) is included and
excluded in different iterations to observe differences. In these regressions, the coefficient
of interest is for the variable event1 or event2. For each set of regressions, the specification
of interest is test 2, where event1 or event2 is set to one for the date of interest and all dates
thereafter. I will describe the results for the weekly, monthly, and daily regressions for
event1 and event2. All results can be found in Table 6. For a graphical representation of
Euro-USD exchange rate patterns, refer to Figure 5.

Event 1
The first set of regressions that I conducted were for event1. The results for the
regressions using weekly data are illustrated in Table 6. The t-values for event1 in both
regressions are insignificant at all levels.
Monthly data results are also found in Table 6. Without time included, event1 has
a 0.00803 coefficient. This shows that following 1 January 2002, the Euro-USD discount
premium rate saw a 0.008029 increase. With the time trend included, the coefficient on
event1 is -0.01687, which translates to a depreciation in the rate following the first event
of demonetization. The t-values for event1 in both regressions are significant at the 1%,
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Discount_exch, the 3-month forward discount rate, can be calculated as
.
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟

𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
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5%, and 10% level. This provides evidence of a significant effect of Euro adoption on
exchange rates when examining monthly data.
The daily rate regression results are listed in Table 6. T-values for event1 in both
regressions are insignificant at all levels.

Event 2
The following set of regressions were conducted to investigated event2, which
corresponds to the date 28 February 2002.
The weekly rate regression results can be found in Table 6. Examining the results
when time is excluded from the model, I obtained a coefficient of -0.00128 on event2. This
indicates a 0.00128-unit decrease in the discount premium rate following the official
nullification of local member currencies. With time included, I obtained a 0.004505
coefficient on event2 that is significant at the 10% level. This translates to an appreciation
of the exchange rate following 28 February 2002. The coefficient for the model without
time is insignificant. The significant test reveals an effect of local EU member currency
demonetization on the Euro-USD exchange rate. This allows us to infer a potential
relationship between demonetization, currency appreciation, and the size of the
underground economy.
Monthly rate regressions were calculated. For the model that excludes time, event2
has a 0.00829 coefficient, which means that following the second date of Euroization, the
Euro-USD discount premium rate appreciated by 0.00829 units. Including time, event2 has
a coefficient of -0.01498. This means that following the second date of interest, the rate
dropped by 0.01498 units. T-values for event2 in both regressions are significant at the
10% level. This indicates concludes a relationship between demonetization and exchange
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rate appreciation. When the currency appreciates, individuals are incentivized to substitute
existing currency – in this case, local currency – with the new, stronger currency – the
Euro.
Finally, the daily rate regression results were collected. With time, event2 is
significant at the 10% level and has a coefficient of 0.006405, which explains an
appreciation in the rate following 28 February 2002. The t-value for the model without time
shows insignificance, however.

II. Naira
Buharinomics was General Buhari’s economic currency reform program in 1984 to
revive the economy. 24 In April 1984, Buhari conducted a demonetization of the Naira by
voiding all existing notes in order to change the color schemes of all currency in circulation.
The empirical analysis for this event was constrained by the absence of official Naira-USD
exchange rate data. As a result, monthly Naira-USD black market exchange rates were
utilized in this analysis.
All Naira regressions follow a standard model of regressing the exchange rate
(exchrate) against four lags of this variable (L(1/4). exchrate) and the dummy variable
representing April 1984 (event1). The time trend variable (time) is included and excluded
in different iterations to observe differences. Specifications for each regression can be
found in Table 3. The specification of interest is Test 2.
The results can be found in Table 7. I began by first excluding time from the model.
This regression produced a resulting 3.81823 coefficient on event1. In the second
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For more information on Buharinomics, see http://www.afriheritage.org/ar/latenew/147-can-a-new-buharinomics-save-nigeria
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regression, which included the time trend variable time, event1 has a coefficient of 0.615.
The t-value for the first regression is extremely significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
This suggests that there is a gradual increase over time that could be distinguished from
any discrete effect of the policy move. On the other hand, the t-value for the second
regression is insignificant at all levels. For a graphical illustration of the exchange rate data,
refer to Figure 6.

III. Kyat
On November 3, 1985, the Burmese government embarked on a demonetization
reform for specific Kyat notes. The empirical analysis for this event was constrained by
the absence of official Kyat-USD exchange rate data. As a result, monthly Kyat-USD black
market exchange rates were utilized in this analysis.
Similar to the Naira regressions, all Kyat regressions follow a model of regressing
the exchange rate (exchrate) against four lags of this variable (L(1/4).exchrate) and the
dummy variable representing April 1984 (event1). The time trend variable (time) is
included and excluded in different iterations to observe differences. Specifications for each
regression can be found in Table 3. The specification of interest is Test 2. Results are shown
in Table 7.
The first regression I conducted was without the time variable. This regression
produced a coefficient of 5.927 for event1. This indicates a strong appreciation of the black
market exchange rate following the 1985 Kyat demonetization case observed. The second
regression incorporates the variable time. In this regression, the coefficient on event1 is 14.807. This translates to a sharp decrease in the black market exchange rate following
November 1985. In both regressions, the t-value for event1 is extremely significant at the
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1%, 5% and 10% levels. For a graphical illustration of the exchange rate data, refer to
Figure 7.

VII. Analysis
The panel regression that I conducted examined the effect of various explanatory
variables on the size of the underground economy from 1998 to 2015. I was interested in
specifically understanding the impact of demonetization on the size of the underground
economy. The variable of interest in this regression is eurojoin, which indicates when each
member state adopted the Euro. While the coefficient indicates a potential 17.52% increase
in the size of the underground economy if a country adopts the Euro, we cannot confirm
that this is the case because of statistical insignificance. Additionally, as other explanatory
variables, such as inflation rates, interest rates, unemployment rates, corruption rankings,
GDP per capita, electric power consumption, and GDP growth rates are added to the model,
the effect of adopting the Euro on the size of the underground economy rises to 30.44%,
but this coefficient remains statistically insignificant. These findings run contrary to the
notion that demonetization reduces the size of the underground economy, as adopting the
Euro leads to an apparent growth in the size of the shadow economy. However, it is worth
noting that the panel regression runs over 18 years, with a majority of member states
adopting the Euro in 2002. This motivates an exploration into other factors, such as de
facto currency substitution, that could have catered to an increase in the years following
adoption. Moreover, looking at currency substitution incentive is crucial given the
possibility of an increase in illegal activity despite strong monitoring during
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demonetization that would have subjected criminals to regulatory scrutiny. De facto
currency demand arises when a population loses faith in the credibility of a local currency
and opts to obtain foreign currency in forms of cash.
Investigating currency demand requires an exploration of exchange rate. I achieved
this through running exchange rate multivariate regressions for the cases of demonetization
of the Euro, Naira, and Kyat, to understand the role that foreign currency substitution can
play in explaining an increase or lack of change in the size of an underground economy.
The first set of regressions were carried out to examine the effect of 2002 Euroization. The
two dates important to Euroization were 1 January 2002, and 28 February 2002,
represented by event1 and event2 in the models. By identifying various specifications to
understand the short-term, long-term and immediate impact of demonetization, I was able
to investigate the effect of demonetization policy on these two dates on the Euro-USD
forward discount premium rate. I utilized weekly, monthly, and daily data. My findings
indicate that the introduction of the Euro on 1 January 2002, and the demonetization of
local currencies on 28 February 2002, resulted in an overall appreciation of the Euro-USD
forward discount premium, given the statistical significance of many of the resulting
coefficients. This is consistent with the idea that currency appreciation occurs as a result
of a reduction in the money supply. The introduction of a new, unionized currency
encourages replacement of old currency, and a wider usage of the Euro. The efficient and
effective execution of Euro introduction allowed the EU to replace existing local currency
in circulation with Euro banknotes and coins, which could have minimized the effects of a
contraction in the money supply. This could explain the increase in the size of the
underground economy, given the surge of Euro circulation and the smooth replacement of
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currency in circulation. Despite regulatory requirements for Euro exchange, criminals may
have been able to exchange existing local currency for Euros and could have continued to
engage in illegal activity with Euros. Extending this to the demonetization in India, the
depreciation of the INR to the US Dollar, and the added inconvenience and shortage of
new INR availability, could incentivize participants of the black market to look to foreign
currency alternatives to continue illegal activities. Therefore, Modi’s demonetization
theory is doubtful, given that the size of the black market could remain unchanged, or
increase, in the future.
In the case of the Nigerian Naira and Myanmar Kyat, there is evidence of statistical
significance and an appreciation in the black market monthly exchange rate for the NairaUSD and the Kyat-USD. The dates of interest, April 1984 and 3 November 1985
respectively, are represented by the variable event1 in each model. In the case of the Naira,
both regressions produce significant positive coefficients on the variable event1. This
indicates an appreciation of the exchange rate following an episode of demonetization. This
is in line with the belief that currency appreciation is a product of currency demonetization.
It is important to consider the nature of this case of demonetization in understanding these
results. Naira demonetization was executed through a re-coloring of all existing Naira notes
in circulation. What this meant was that no denominations were nullified, but rather
replaced by notes with a new look. Thus, this could have had little impact on the overall
money supply, given that it was a total replacement of all notes in circulation. With regards
to Myanmar, the model that excluded the time trend produced a positive coefficient,
whereas the model that included the time trend resulted in a negative coefficient. This
reveals that the immediate impact of Kyat demonetization resulted in exchange rate
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appreciation, whereas the longer-term effect resulted in currency depreciation. The results
of this regression are intuitive. Short-term appreciation occurred due to the government
announcing that 50 and 100-kyat denominations were no longer legal tender, which would
have reduced the money supply given that these notes were not replaced. Eventually, as
money supply levels were normalized, a depreciation in the exchange rate is an expected
result. In the case of the Naira, the result indicates that introduction of new Naira notes
produced an appreciation of the Naira to the US Dollar. The success of this case of
demonetization is intuitive, as the local currency was not replaced by a new form of
currency, and people were incentivized to exchange black money for new notes of legal
tender. In the case of the Kyat, there was a limited time period, and a limited quantity of
new notes, that could be exchanged. The lack of monitoring via the banking system, paired
with a disorganized and short transitionary period, resulted in a longer-term effect of
currency depreciation of the Kyat to the US Dollar. This could have incentivized those
involved in the informal economy to look to stronger foreign currencies, thereby evading
regulatory scrutiny and continuing illegal transactions using foreign currency instead. This
could explain a lack of reduction, or an increase, in the size of the underground economy,
and the lack of effectiveness of demonetization. In testing Prime Minister Modi’s
demonetization theory, it is important to consider the results of this case, and the possibility
of this result in the future for India, given the lack of regulatory scrutiny, and the shortage
of supply of new INR notes available for withdrawal.
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VIII. Conclusions and Limitations
Demonetization is a policy tool that governments utilize in an effort to reduce the
incidence of an underground economy. Given that the shadow economy operates on cash,
and demonetization nullifies existing notes and coins in circulation, many scholars find it
intuitive that targeted demonetization of large-denomination currency would reduce the
size of an underground economy. This follows because demonetization reduces the
quantity of money in circulation by forcing individuals to exchange existing voided notes
for new legal tender through the formal banking system. As a result, old notes are brought
in and withdrawn from circulation, including black money. However, in countries where
poor monitoring systems in banks exist, the effectiveness of demonetization can be
ambiguous.
In 2016, Prime Minister Modi embarked on a program of demonetization and
extracted INR 500 and 1000 denominations out of the economy, which made up 86% of
the total cash in circulation in India. He replaced these denominations with new INR 500
and 2000 notes, envisioning a move towards destroying the black economy, corruption,
and counterfeit. Prime Minister Modi launched this policy with the belief that black market
participants would be brought forth through the requirement of exchanging currency
through the formal banking sector, thereby subjecting them to regulatory scrutiny.
Consequently, these deposits of black money would reduce the prevalence of the
underground economy. However, given that India remains an economy that relies on cash,
demonetization has wreaked havoc on the country. The speed of extraction exceeded the
speed of replacement, thereby resulting in endless queues outside ATMs and banks
comprised of scores of people waiting to exchange their existing notes for new ones. The
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effects of demonetization have brought the overall policy into question. With severe costs
associated with demonetization, economists have hotly debated whether the means justify
the ends, and more specifically, if the ends have even been met.
In this thesis, I looked at Prime Minister Modi’s theory of demonetization and the
effects on the shadow economy in India. Prime Minister Modi believed that by forcing
individuals to exchange hoards of cash at banks and ATM machines, he could successfully
document unreported money and retract black money from circulation. For this to be
successful, however, a strong monitoring system in the formal banking sector should be in
place, which should discourage cash hoarding and encourage income reporting. Prime
Minister Modi has attempted to establish this in a country that is largely dependent on cash,
and where scores of people continue to remain unbanked. As a result, demonetization has
had dire consequences; the nullification of 86% of notes in circulation has impacted the
economy negatively. Prime Minister Modi, however, justifies the negative economic
effects with the expectation of a great reduction, and ultimate destruction, of the shadow
economy, given that large-denomination notes are most frequently used in this economy. I
tested this theory by first examining whether demonetization reduces black market activity
for the case of the 2002 introduction of the Euro, and the consequent demonetization of
local EU member currencies. By aggregating explanatory variables identified by Feige
(1979), Schneider (2005), Tanzi (1983), Bordo and Choudhri (1982), Btejer (1978), and
Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984), I estimated a panel regression from 1998 to 2015 to
explore the significance of adopting the Euro on the size of EU underground economies.
My study finds no evidence that supports the view that demonetization reduces the size of
the underground economy. I find that, on its own, joining the European Monetary Union
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increases the size of the underground economy. Having said this, the insignificance of this
coefficient does not allow for a confirmation or denial of this claim. Furthermore,
accounting for other explanatory variables, the effect of adopting the Euro could lead to a
further increase in the size of the underground economy. This result contrasts the theory
that demonetization results in a reduction in the size of the underground economy. Thus,
in order to understand these results, albeit the insignificance, it is necessary to investigate
other factors that affect cash demand, given that the underground economy hinges on cash
in circulation. Examining exchange rate patterns could illuminate any incentive for
currency substitution and an increase in cash in circulation.
To motivate this exploration, I examined the impact of demonetization on exchange
rates to understand the potential for currency substitution in the shadow economy.
Incentive for currency substitution could explain any lack of change, or an increase, in the
size of the underground economy, given currency demonetization. I explored this in the
second portion of my empirical analysis through a series of multivariate regressions that
examine the impact of demonetization on the exchange rates for three different cases:
Europe in 2002, Nigeria in 1984, and Myanmar in 1985. In the first two cases, my findings
indicate a long-term appreciation of the exchange rate against the USD following the event
of demonetization. These results are consistent with the notion that demonetization results
in a contraction of the money supply and thus, results in an appreciation of the exchange
rate. These results can be contextualized by the nature of these cases of demonetization. In
the case of Euro introduction in 2002, however, a new currency was introduced, and
existing local currencies were nullified. This may have left the money supply largely
unaffected given the effective replacement of cash in circulation. In the case of the Naira,
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Buhari’s move to change the color of all notes in circulation was seen as an episode of
demonetization. In effect, changing the color of all notes is simply a nullification of
existing currency but an immediate replacement of all denominations in circulation, which
could insignificantly impact the money supply. In the case of Myanmar, the long-term
effect of demonetization resulted in a depreciation of the exchange rate. The long-term
impact contrasts the traditional notion of the effect of demonetization, but the short-term
impact is intuitive given the episode of demonetization destroyed 50 and 100-kyat
denominations and reduced the effective money supply.
The results of this paper reveal that in past cases, demonetization has resulted in an
increase in the size of an underground economy. The introduction of a new INR 2000 note
can be likened to the introduction of the Euro as a new currency. Even though I was unable
to establish a causal effect, the results of the panel regression indicate some correlation
between the introduction of a new currency and the growth of underground economies.
From examining the effect of demonetization on the exchange rate, we can infer that the
resulting exchange rate appreciation revealed in the results can provide evidence of an
unchanged money supply. If all else is held constant, this could allow for a continuation,
and increase, in illegal activity. This case can be made in predicting the long-term impact
of demonetization in India, which adds to the skepticism that economists have of the
effectiveness of demonetization. Thus, I conclude that Prime Minister Modi’s theory of
demonetization lacks substance, and there is a case that can be made for an incentive to
substitute foreign currency for local currency and dodge regulatory scrutiny during
demonetization.
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There are limitations to my empirical analysis that explain the statistical
insignificance of some of my regression results. With respect to my panel regression, I
included a few of many explanatory and control variables that explain the incidence of an
underground economy. For the purpose of this thesis, however, I limited the regression to
include 7 explanatory variables. However, as a result, this leaves room for omitted variable
bias, and thus, the model could be over-estimating or under-estimating the effect of one of
the included variables on the dependent variable, the size of the underground economy. For
example, there could exist a relationship between higher social security contributions and
incentive for starting a business in the underground economy to reduce the cost of
production. Secondly, in the multivariate exchange rate regressions that I conducted, I
limited the independent variables to be a few lags of the dependent variable, a time trend
variable, and a dummy variable to represent the event of demonetization and the time
thereafter. This also leaves room for omitted variable bias, given that there could be a
plethora of other factors that could influence exchange rate patterns. For example, inflation
rates, interest rates, and current account deficits are a few variables that could have been
included in the model, as they directly affect exchange rates. I chose to exclude these
variables given that the focus of my analysis was on the specific effect of demonetization
on exchange rates.
Future studies could look to include additional variables in each of these empirical
methods in order to establish higher causal relationships. There are many opportunities to
further analyze the long-term impact of demonetization on the Indian economy. For
example, one could explore other explanatory variables that simultaneously affect
exchange rates and the size of the underground economy to identify a strong link between
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these entities. Alternatively, an exploration of cases of de facto currency substitution in the
underground economy following episodes of demonetization can shed light on the future
of the Indian shadow economy. These studies would be value-adding in understanding the
real outcome of the demonetization and the “Modi effect”.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Shadow Economy and Growth Rate of Cash Usage

Source: Takala, Kari and Viren, Matti. “Is Cash Used in the Shadow Economy?”,
International Economic Journal Vol. 24 (December 13, 2010):
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Figure 2: Scatter Plots of Size of the Underground Economy for Euro-19 Countries
(1998-2015)

Table 5: Panel Regression Independent and Dependent Variables

Source: Generated on STATA
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Figure 3: Year against Average Underground Economy Size for Euro-19 Countries
(1998-2015)

Source: Data extracted from Schneider, Friedrich. “Shadow Economies
and Corruption All Over The World: What Do We Really Know?”, IZA
Discussion Paper Series No. 2315 (2006), generated on Excel

Figure 4: Summary Statistics for Main Panel Regression of Euro-19
Countries (1998-2015)
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Figure 5: Euro-USD Exchange Rate (1999-2003)

[Generated on Excel]
Figure 6: Naira-USD Black Market Exchange Rate (1981-1987)

[Generated on Excel]
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Figure 7: Kyat-USD Black Market Exchange Rate (1983-1989)

[Generated on Excel]
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